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Democratic Credentials*
Don Herzog
We've made a mistake, urges Bruce Ackerman. We've failed to notice,
or have forgotten, that ours is a dualist democracy: ordinary representatives passing their statutes are in fact the democratic inferiors of We
the People, who at rare junctures appear on the scene and affirm new
constitutional principles. (Actually, he claims in passing that we have
a three-track democracy.)' Dwelling lovingly on dualism, Ackerman
doesn't quite forget to discuss democracy, but he comes close.
I want to raise some questions about the democratic credentials
of Ackerman's view. Not, perhaps, the ones he anticipates. So I don't
mean to argue that the Constitution places illicit restraints on popularly elected assemblies: I find the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty at least as boring as does Ackerman. (More generally, any legal
theory promising to relax our obsessive focus on appellate review is
to be applauded, though ironically, this one turns out to be very much
about that after all.) Nor do I mean to cast Publius as the fiend who
subverts the democratic promise of the Revolution in the name of
class interest: I find Beard and his legacy at least as mischievous as
does Ackerman. (Though Arendt's quirky misreading of Athenian
democracy is a dubious remedy.)
Democracy, to say something screamingly obvious, is a complex
ideal. I am historicist enough to believe that a fully adequate account
of democracy must in part be a critical history not just of the concept,
not just of some classic texts of democractic theory, but of high politics
and social practices as well. Since I can't provide that history here, I
will instead have to rely on an appeal to the reader's linguistic intuitions
and baldly assert that the complexities I discuss here are indeed internal to democratic theory.

* My thanks to Heidi Li Feldman, Larry Kramer, Rick Pildes, and Terry Sandalow
for comments on a draft.
1. Bruce Ackerman, We the People, vol. 1, Foundations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, Belknap Press, 1991), p. 300. All page references in the text are to
Ackerman's book.
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FORM AND CONTENT, DEMOCRACY AND RIGHTS
Against "rights foundationalists," Ackerman holds that whatever rights
the Supreme Court is justified in enforcing (and whatever rights we
have?) are those democratically affirmed by the last incarnation of We
the People. (Because they have the right to decide what our rights
are? And where did that right come from?) In their quest for "the
Right rights," these foundationalists turn to classic philosophical texts.
Their "discourse is invariably esoteric"; they suffer an "antidemocratic
disease"; they reveal "the elitism involved in removing fundamental
questions from the democratic process" (p. 12).
Here Ackerman imagines (or caricatures) a rights theorist who
wants to secure some right by arguing that it's so important that not
even a democratic process ought to be allowed to override it. There
may be good arguments for such a view, but leave that aside. Instead,
consider a different strategy a rights theorist might adopt, one holding
that some rights are required to make sense of the claim that whatever
ensues is democratic.2
Take the right of free speech and its various concomitants: diverse
news media recognizing a Weberian obligation to dig up facts embarrassing all partisan points of view, the availability of vigorous public
debate, and so on. Notice that the right in turn depends on the development of a loyal opposition, now a bland label but once, given familiar
views of social order as consensus, a threatening oxymoron. One might
well believe that democracy is at least in part something like government by discussion, that public debate is central, voting (whether in
elections or legislatures) merely a subordinate device for capturing the
current sense of the debate. (So one might doubt the historiographic
convention that casts liberalism and democracy as uneasy allies or
cordial foes.)
Now suppose that the people decide on massive incursions against
free speech. Decades of Republican whining about the alleged biases
of the liberal media pay off in spectacular political dividends: Peter
Jennings is placed under house arrest; CNN is instructed to broadcast
Rocky and Bullwinkle reruns twenty-four hours a day; major American newspapers are censored, or instructed to do nothing but reprint

2. For one version of the general argument, see Amy Gutmann, "How Liberal is
Democracy?" in LiberalismReconsidered,ed. Douglas MacLean and Claudia Mills (Totowa,
N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983). John Hart Ely, Democracyand Distrust: A Theoryof
Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), offers such a view
in the context of constitutional law. Ackerman indicts him as a monist but does not
notice the implications of his strategy for thinking about democracy and rights. Then
again, Ely thinks that by turning to "democracy" he has answered some questions; in
fact, he has raised new ones, and judges and others might well disagree on what it
means to reinforce democracy.
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official government press releases without comment; and so on. Would
this be a democratic decision?
Suppose the decision followed vigorous public debate with lots of
competing views championed and heard respectfully. Then one might
describe it as a democratic decision to suspend or overturn or abridge
democracy itself. Imagining another kind of repellent amendment,
Ackerman comments, "I do not believe that judges would be justified
in asserting a general authority to protect the fundamental principles
of dualist democracy against repudiation by the People" (p. 16 n.). But
more is at stake than the scope of judicial authority. We want to know
if "the People" can do anything they like and nonetheless remain
"the People," or if some of their actions threaten or undercut their
own status.
Now consider the decisions taken after the assault on free speech
is institutionalized as higher law. Elections don't feature even the impoverished public debate they now do. Proceedings within the legislative chambers change, too: communicative links between representatives and constituents are far sketchier than before; or perhaps the
majority party takes advantage of parliamentary rules by allowing
minority members to take the floor only on alternate Tuesday mornings. Are elections and legislative acts democratic any more?
More important here: consider the next broad-based popular
movement, say a drive to adopt various green principles and systematically downgrade whatever private law might seem to protect smokestacks, dumping, and the rest. Respecting the terms of the last constitutional settlement, this new movement takes place with little or no
public debate. Does it qualify as higher lawmaking, as the waking of
We the People? Ackerman lists three criteria for identifying such a
movement: depth, breadth, and decisiveness. Here I want to focus on
depth: "A private citizen's support is deep when she has deliberated as
much about her commitment to a national ideal as she thinks appropriate in making a considered judgment on an important decision in her
private life" (pp. 273-74).
If we take this at face value, it is not clear that any incursion on
free speech, however severe, could threaten the credentials of the
people here. For Ackerman is describing a kind of citizenship that is
private with a vengeance, one in which every citizen can do all her
deliberating sitting by herself, daydreaming over a cup of coffee in
the morning, just as she might in thinking about whether to take a
new job or have another child. It is more charitable, though, to think
that Ackerman's prose is sloppy. For he clearly thinks that when the
sleepy or absent people rise to life, they deliberate together, as a
community.
I have chosen free speech only for illustrative purposes; there
may be other tacit criteria governing the use of 'the people'. Take one
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of Ackerman's own claims: "Apart from the special need for tolerance,
the citizenship perspective will often require you to reflect on the vast
size of your country, the need to give interests of Americans on the
other side of the continent equal weight to your neighbor's. As citizens,
all of us are equals; no region, race, or sect can be ruthlessly sacrificed
to the rest" (pp. 298-99). What kind of claim is this?
It might be taken as a request or advice or exhortation: Ackerman
means only to recommend one mode of deliberation that he takes to
be attractive, but we are free to spurn the recommendation. Or it
might be taken as a substantive moral or political requirement: we
must deliberate this way, else we do significant wrong. Or, again, it
might be taken as stating criteria governing the use of 'citizenship':
so people who fail to deliberate this way can't be described as citizens
at all, not even as bad citizens, and can't politically act as the people.
To sharpen what's at stake in these competing glosses, imagine a
popular movement that, after plenty of deliberation, moves to consecrate certain facets of contemporary racism with all the lofty imprimatur of constitutional law. The Reconstruction amendments are to be
overturned; blacks are to be officially recognized as second-class citizens or stripped of citizenship altogether; claims of gross economic
inequality, of differential treatment in criminal proceedings, and so
on are to have no weight in law or are to be taken as inherently
choiceworthy, as legitimate goals of state action.
What might Ackerman say about this? Not, I trust, that it can't
happen here. (I write in the immediate aftermath of the Rodney King
fiasco, but we didn't need that to notice that ours is a profoundly racist
society.) As Ackerman sometimes grants in passing but more often
blithely ignores, the people aren't some harmoniously unified commuprofoundly divided: the currently fashionable
nity. They-we-are
troika is race, class, gender, but of course there are many more cleavages. So such an explicitly racist movement could emerge. And it
could easily meet his three official conditions of depth (degree of
deliberation), breadth (quantity of support), and decisiveness (defeating every plausible alternative in turn). But it wouldn't fit the
language I've just quoted, for it would ruthlessly flaunt even minimal
requirements of equality and impartiality.
If that language is just exhortation, then Ackerman might shrug:
"Look, I refuse to play fancy Europhile philosopher and identify what
rights people have over and against our higher democratic politics; I
happen to loathe this decision, but the People have now spoken." If
the language is a moral or political requirement, Ackerman might
instead concede that the people have spoken, but urge that they
haven't done so in any way we need to recognize as binding. So again
would arise problems about what courts and other bodies ought to do
in the face of such outrageous developments. If the language states
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criteria governing our use of 'the people', Ackerman might deny that
such problems arise in the first place. But then he would be insisting
that some rights are integral to democratic politics in the very strong
sense that one can't even recognize a decision as democratic if it violates
those rights.
Another approach to this idea: Ackerman asserts that in his view,
private citizenship, not dualism, "is foundational" (p. 300). But the
very possibility of private citizenship depends on a robust state/society
distinction, on the existence of extrapolitical social spaces. And that
means that rights less obviously connected to democracy will be constitutively required to make sense of Ackerman's vision. Rights such
as religious toleration, private property, and domestic privacy help
demarcate some realms of society as being in some sense off-limits to
politics. If private citizenship is "foundational" in any straightforward
sense, the whole scheme presupposes some such set of rights.
I chose free speech purely for illustrative purposes; so too (the
devil can quote Scripture) the language of equality and impartiality
and that of private citizenship. More generally, one might put the
point this way: whether it is sensible to talk about the people acting
in constitutionally binding ways depends on background criteria of
various kinds. Some of these criteria look like substantive moral requirements, even rights. But then the project of distinguishing the
merely formal requirements of democratic action from the substance
of rights will collapse; calling the Constitution "democratic first, rightsprotecting second" (p. 13) will be confounding, not illuminating. And
the business of deriding rights theorists as diseased bookworms will
turn out to be utterly bankrupt.
One last way to drive to the same point: the distinction between
normal and constitutional politics turns out to be (at least) three distinctions mapped onto each other. Normal politics is pursued by elected
representatives, constitutional by the people themselves; normal politics is not particularly reflective, constitutional is; normal politics is
about the pluralist pursuit of group interest, constitutional about principle and the common good. But these distinctions may diverge; indeed, any connections among them seem utterly contingent. Ackerman's explicit criteria capture the first two, but not the last. So what
shall we say about putative constitutional movements that do not adopt
misguided or pernicious principles, but don't seem principled at all?
(The people deliberate and decide to affirm publicly that politics ought
to benefit the middle class at the expense of rich and poor, and they
refuse to offer any principled justification for doing so.)
What is at stake in asking whether any or all of these decisions is
democratic? Not just the meaning of a word, surely; rather, their
legitimacy, or the reasons we have for upholding a certain framework
of political decision making, for thinking that ordinarily at least the
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laws it issues in oblige citizens and that the framework is worth upholding. There is no magic surrounding the people, even if we solemnly
capitalize them as We the People, such that their actions automatically
command respect. Or, put differently, absent certain background conditions, we may want to say that broad-based popular movements don't
count as the actions of the people, or We the People.
I suppose one could always take the short way with dissenters,
here as elsewhere, and say that the three official criteria are exhaustive.
Depth doesn't even presuppose free speech, one might argue, because
it is deliberately cast in terms of a solitary citizen pondering the alternatives. Nothing surrounding the evocative if vague contrast of "private
citizenship" with "private citizenship"should be taken to suggest anything like impartiality, equality, or the common good being taken as
a necessary condition of the actions of citizens. And so on.
But this won't do. As a methodological matter, I suspect that in
this sort of terrain one never finds anything as crisply architectonic as
necessary and sufficient criteria, anyway. One roughly identifies the
outlines of a concept and then agrees on some version of an indefeasibility thesis, that in often surprising and indefinitely many ways the
scope of the concept will depend on factors we haven't yet noticed.
As a substantive matter, paring down the criteria to the three stated
ones threatens to turn the higher lawmaking moments of dualist democracy into nothing but crass majoritarianism. And that, surely,
doesn't inspire gushy epiphanies. It plays into the hands of centuries
of distinguished antidemocratic theory caustically mocking the thought
that the mob or multitude or many-headed monster have any claim
to rule. That 51 percent (or 73 percent or 99 percent) of the people
want to do something is not yet enough to engage the attention of
democratic theorists, let alone anyone else. Casting democracy as a
matter of counting heads or aggregating preferences is an impoverished approach; the prevalence of such views is lamentable.
Perhaps I should emphasize that the strategy of casting rights as
presuppositions of democracy isn't a sneaky way of denying the people
any significant discretion, so that one and only one program-call it
the politically correct one-is really democratic after all. There's still
plenty of room for tenacious political disagreements; indeed, for a
democratic society to adopt bad policies. I happen to think of our
fabled budget deficits as terribly imprudent and unjust, but I have no
problem describing them as democratic.
JUDICIAL REVIEW, CONSENT, PARTNERSHIP, IDENTITY
One sometimes hears that Marshall single-handedly invented judicial
review in Marbury v. Madison. But this seems contrived: Hamilton,
anyway, casts judicial review as an integral part of the constitutional
scheme. And his presentation in Federalist 78 lends itself to a dualist
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reading: "A constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by thejudges
as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its
meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from
the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcileable
variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and
validity ought of course to be preferred; or in other words, the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people
to the intention of their agents."3 Here's the solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty: downgrade the democratic credentials of legislation, upgrade those of constitutional law, and the Supreme Court can
protect the people against those only problematically representing
them.
Addressed to (some of) Publius's contemporaries, and given a
certain understanding of what those popular ratifying conventions
were about,4 it makes sense. Those particular contemporaries, after
all, had taken part in debates over ratifying the convention. Some of
them, say a majority of them, had voted for ratification. Now the
skeptical objections arise: not women, not blacks, and so on; and some
of those formally eligible, after all, opposed ratification.
Here I want to press a different objection. The argument looks
like it comes with a ticking stopwatch: its cogency seems to recede over
time. As the years go by, fewer and fewer even of those who voted
for ratification survive. (And some of them may have changed their
minds.) Grant for the moment that the New Deal was a successful
the last one. Then it is one thing to
constitutional moment-and
defend the democratic legitimacy of judicial review in 1937, another
in 1947, and so on. And in 1992? How many living citizens took part
in the New Deal? Can we tell today's citizens that we respect their
democratic action by overturning the acts of their elected representatives in the name of what "they" did decades ago? ("What I did before
I was born, eh?")
The objection depends on a certain conception of how to identify
the people, or We the People: line up the living and count. Some of
Ackerman's own language suggests such a view, in particular when
he plays the game of suggesting percentage thresholds for identifying
potential action by the people (pp. 274-75). But this conception could
easily be contested. In part, the history of social and political theory
is a series of debates over how' to identify the people.
3. The Federalist, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University
Press, 1961), no. 78, p. 525. Though referring to elected representatives as "agents"
suggests a much less tenuous tie than Ackerman has in mind.
See particu4. An understanding that of course could be-and was-challenged.
larly "The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania To Their Constituents," in The CompleteAntifederalist,ed. Herbert J. Storing, 7
vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), vol. 3, pp. 145-67.
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Two obvious solutions depend on views that Ackerman seems
inclined to renounce. One: even if those alive didn't themselves act
during the New Deal, they could overturn it if they liked; so they
consent to it; so it counts as their action. (This is how Hobbes reconciles
the claim that law is the command of the sovereign with the existence
of laws predating the sovereign.)5 Yet Ackerman writes, "I myself have
never been enamored by the principle of consent, at least when it is
used to serve as the bedrock of political life" (p. 357, n. 9). I have no
such sweepingly general commitments for or against consent, but I'm
happy to grant that this invocation of consent seems contrived. It
underestimates the difficulties in overturning the last constitutional
settlement. (Compare: "We needn't worry about even the most recklessly activist courts, because the people or their representatives can
always overturn judgments they dislike.")
Two: historical communities have far longer life spans than individuals; American society is several hundred years old; so those Americans who happen to be alive today are implicated in the actions of
those coming before and after them. (This is one thrust of Burke's
savage subversion of social contract theory: "Society is indeed a contract," but a partnership "between those who are living, those who are
dead, and those who are to be born.")6 To be an American, then, is
in part to be a member of the community that adopted the principles
of the New Deal, whether or not one happened to be alive then. Notice
that the argument deals in precisely the same way with problems posed
by unborn Americans, living Americans who opposed the New Deal,
and living Americans not enfranchised to have a view on it: by offering
an account of their identity that makes them responsible. (And notice
that the argument needs to distinguish American citizens, whose identity is to implicate them in this way, from, say, plumbers or violinists
or tiddlywinks players, whom we may well think aren't bound at all
by the actions of their predecessors.)
In disdaining "Burkeans," Ackerman does grant that "the challenge ... is to locate ourselves in a conversation between generations."
After all, we "enter upon a political stage already set with a complex
symbolic practice charged with meaning by the thought and action of
prior generations" (p. 23). Yet he falls short of affirming that in some
important sense their actions are already our actions. Indeed, Ackerman's insistently American stance would make it hard for him to make
any such affirmation. For he inherits from Jefferson and Paine the
memorable slogan that the earth belongs to the living. That slogan,
5. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 184.
6. Edmund Burke, Reflectionson the Revolution in France, in The Worksof the Right
Honorable Edmund Burke, 12 vols. (Boston, Little, Brown, 1889), vol. 3, p. 359.
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once turned against feudal property regimes to suggest that one can't
rightly be born a serf just because one's great-great-grandfather consented to serfdom, comes to stand for a kind of democratic exuberance
in debunking the claims of history and tradition. Democrats have routinely derided appeals to the wisdom embedded in our inherited practices as contemptible lapses into necrophilia and ancestor worship. So
Ackerman wants us to be able to learn from the past, but he wants us
to remember that we can pursue radical change whenever we see fit.
His argument thus requires some constructive account of the
identity of the American people. He has to explain how we can coherently be taken to act as a corporate entity in ways that stretch over many
generations, so that "we" can in 1992 finish an Article 5 ratification
procedure that was begun some two hundred years ago. He has to
explain the possibility of a binding unity in the face of deep cleavages
over race, class, gender, and more. (It is emphatically not enough to
notice occasionally that blacks, women, and others have been badly
treated despite the inspiring possibilities of American constitutionalism
and then simply urge them to join in to make it even better. Or, to
put it differently, sighs about the "incredible diversity of lived experience [as] one of the great glories of America" [p. 306] can be met with
acerbic reminders about some of the facets of that diversity: crack,
homelessness, street crime, child abuse, and on and on.) He has to tell
us what to make of permanent minorities, of those so lackadaisical
about politics that even high constitutional issues don't engage their
attention, especially if they are lackadaisical not because they are raptly
absorbed in the pleasures of private life but because they are utterly
dispirited, impotent, crushed by their prior unjust treatment in the
political realm. He has to tell us if blacks, women, children, felons,
the "mentally ill," and others disenfranchised in American history are
nonetheless part of the people, and if not, why they might still owe
allegiance to the constitutional order. Invoking the phrase "We the
People" masks substantive difficulties. At best, it counts as a promissory
note for an argument forthcoming. Until that argument is on the
table, the theory remains seriously incomplete.
Can these questions be laid at the doorstep of democratic politics?
It's paradoxical to assert that the people are just whoever the people
say they are. We can relax the paradox, though not eliminate it, by
adding a temporal dimension. It may be illuminating, not incoherent,
to say that the people decided to admit women into their ranks. Still,
we need at least some threshold or benchmark conception for identifying the people-not just for knowing who counts at the beginning
of the historical narrative, but also to provide some critical distance
from the decisions that happen to be taken along the way. So the
putatively illuminating claim assumes that an exclusively male group
can qualify as the people, and some may well want to deny that.
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HISTORY, PUBLICITY, MYSTIFICATION
The thought that the earth belongs to the living also fueled one of
Jefferson's characteristically exotic arguments, complete with careful
demographic calculations: that the Constitution ought to be rewritten
every nineteen years. Madison scorned the view.7 Ackerman follows
Madison in rejecting the view that there ought to be regularly scheduled rewritings of the Constitution (pp. 176-77). But he overlooks
one of Madison's reasons: "Frequent appeals would in great measure
deprive the government of that veneration, which time bestows on
every thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite stability.... A nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings
wished for by Plato. And in every other nation, the most rational
government will not find it a superfluous advantage, to have the prejudices of the community on its side."8Ackerman assures us that "Publius
refuses to learn the same lesson which Burke was to draw from the
crowds of the French Revolution" (p. 177). But this is a tad too quick.
The language of time, veneration, and prejudice is Burkean through
and through.9 True, Madison doesn't identify it as his most important
reason; but there it is, stuck in the middle of the Federalist. Publius's
mantle aside, there are some pressing questions here about democracy,
publicity, and illusion.
If democracy is something like government by discussion, we find
ourselves politically engaged in demystifying, enlightening, exposing
the allegedly arcane mysteries of statecraft to the view of the vulgar.
So early Jacobins and democrats championed the public sphere, mass
literacy, vivid newspaper coverage of politics, heated arguments in
local taverns and coffeehouses; so Burke grumbled that "this new
conquering empire of light and reason" would dissolve "all the pleasing
illusions which made power gentle and obedience liberal."10
Publicity here isn't part of some technical Kantian apparatus for
thinking about socialjustice; it's profoundly political. It's a complex ideal:
epistemologically, it calls for arguments available to all; sociologically for
spaces like coffeehouses in which ordinary men and women can meet

7. For an incisive treatment of the exchange and the surrounding issues, see Stephen Holmes, "Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy," in Constitutionalism
and Democracy,ed. Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988).
8. Federalist, no. 49, p. 340.
9. Similarly, Holmes writes, "According to Jefferson, 'some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the arc of the covenant, too
sacred to be touched.' Madison was not one of these men" (p. 218). No, but Madison
did wish others to incline that way.
10. Burke, vol. 3, pp. 332-33.
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to debate public affairs; politically, for an egalitarian recognition of those
ordinary men and women as dignified agents entitled to participate in
shaping their society. So the famed transformation of subjects into citizens depends crucially on publicity. This is why Paine so ruthlessly debunks the lofty theatrical trappings of monarchy, why he insists that the
business of government can and should be made simple. It is why James
Mackintosh sneers, "To pronounce that men are only to be governed
by delusion is to libel the human understanding, and to consecrate the
frauds that have elevated Despots and Muftis, Pontiffs and Sultans, on
the ruin of degraded and oppressed humanity."11
Sometimes Ackerman sounds like a radical prophet of publicity
himself- or, not quite the same thing, a publicist. Take the remarkable
language of imploring advertisement he sometimes succumbs to in
urging the reader to purchase and read the FederalistPapers or Gordon
Wood's Creation of the AmericanRepublic: "Perhaps you will pick up a
paperback copy [of the Federalist] when you are next in a bookstore?
Isn't it about time for you to encounter the Founding at first hand?"
Or again, "The last chapter encouraged you to explore these dualist
themes by picking up the FederalistPapers at your local bookstore and
giving them a close (re-)reading. While it may be harder to get your
hands on Wood's magisterial work, try to do so" (pp. 201, 218). One
presumes this advice isn't addressed to university professors.
Then again, Ackerman can also write, "the labor movement and
the peace movement, blacks and ethnics, feminists and environmentalists look upon each other with anxiety and suspicion. The very thought
less common ground with
they might find common ground-much
to many a vain illusion. But is
more mainstream Americans-seems
it an illusion we can afford to live without?" (p. 318). The Jacobin
impulse is that if it is an illusion, we can and must live without it: it
is just another piece of mystification that stands in the way of a sober
appraisal of our grim circumstances. Is Ackerman the writer who
genuinely believes progress is possible? Then why does he call this
thought an illusion? Or is he the one who wants us to believe it because
the belief is reassuring, because it will help uphold an unjust regime
by clothing it in illusion?
More generally, consider Ackerman's uses of history. I wonder if
poor Clio can shoulder the burdens he assigns her. Sometimes he
appeals to a Dragnet theory of history, on which 'just the facts, ma'am,
nothing but the facts" will suffice to buttress his case: "This narrative
cannot withstand an encounter with the facts of American History";
11. James Mackintosh, Vindiciae Gallicae: Defence of the French Revolution and its
English Admirersagainst the Accusations of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke; Including Some
Strictureson the Late Production of Mons de Calonne (1791; reprint, Oxford: Woodstock
Books, 1989, intro. Jonathan Wordsworth), p. 307.

(p. 39, 44).
But of course the facts are complex, ambiguous, open to competing
interpretations. I have not mastered the historiography of American
public law, but somehow I doubt that the conventional wisdom is so
utterly misconceived that merely invoking "the facts" can shatter it.
Notice that we might agree to follow Ackerman's historical turn
but disagree with his account, and at different levels of abstraction.
Maybe he has misread CaroleneProducts or misunderstands the Reconstruction amendments. Or we might deny, for instance, that he has
rightly identified the three constitutional episodes of American history.
Some might well argue that the tumultuous events of the 1960s constitute an independently successful constitutional revolution, not just an
affirming footnote to the New Deal that helps make sense of Brown
v. Board of Education; others might plump for the Reagan years. Still
others will want to undercut the rigidity of the two-track (or threetrack) scheme and urge instead a dimensional or continuous view
along which particular acts may be more or less representative of
the people themselves. Still others will read Publius as holding that
representative government is a better instantiation of democracy than
any direct popular movement because elections and representation
promise to refine public opinion and allow the common good to prevail: this would explain the battery of constitutional provisions that
deliberately make representative government less immediately responsive to popular will, like the electoral college and indirect election of
the Senate. (To recur to the three distinctions between normal and
constitutional politics, Publius may be betting on the combination
representative, reflective, and about the common good.) So the turn
to history isn't the name of a solution to some familiar problems; it's
the name of a new set of problems.
Ackerman sometimes sounds cavalier or innocent in another way.
Sometimes he cheerfully suggests that other scholars' readings of the
FederalistPapers are partial, interested, opportunistic, while his own is
simply faithful to Publius: "Here disagreements abound, as each writer
appropriates the Papers for his or her own programmatic purposes;
despite the cacophony of voices, all fail to hear the voice of the revolutionary Publius" (p. 223)-as though Ackerman has been lucky or
careful or divinely favored enough to receive the textual or historical
message without static or distortion. But this version of a contrast
between interested and accurate interpretation is incoherent. Surely
his own account is like the others, programmatic through and through.
Surely it does what all interpretations always do: it seizes on some
dimensions of the text, downplays others, recontextualizes certain passages to shift their meaning, and so on. After all, why does Ackerman
want to clothe himself in Publian garb? Because it legitimates his own
enterprise: because many of us venerate Publius.
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In this light, consider some striking features of Ackerman's rhetoric: the earnestly preachy tone, the ludicrous use of capital letters
on key words and phrases like We the People, the unabashed and
occasionally cloying enthusiasm for American constitutionalism. Theorists interested in reconstructing the argument may be inclined to
dismiss these features as distracting tics, but rhetoric matters. And
what is the import of this rhetoric? It animates a version of patriotism
I am inclined to take as debased or vulgar: nothing as relentlessly silly
as "America, love it or leave it," but not so critically searching an
appraisal into the way our history has failed our best aspirations as
one might like, either. That kind of patriotic rhetoric meshes all too
well with his flirtation with useful illusions, his stylized invocation of
history as unequivocally and authoritatively on his side, his gathering
himself in Publius's robes, to shut down debate on fundamental issues:
I doubt this is Ackerman's intention, but I do think it one unmistakable
thrust of his work. Here I'd recommend learning from the antidemocrats who have jeered at democratic chatter, legislative talk shops, and
the like. For the issues Ackerman glances over are central to the pursuit
of democratic theory and politics. Perhaps the coming volumes of his
work will address them.

